New Atheism and the intellectual climate

On ‘New Atheism’

It seems to me that the label “new atheism” is useful in that it designates something real; namely the renewed deliberate and focused pushback against the excesses of religions in the fashion led by the “four horsemen” Sam Harris, Richard Dawkins, Christopher Hitchens and Daniel Dennett. The four horsemen, with many others, held a highly relevant presence in public discourse. It also had a self-conscious following of fairly educated people.

In The God Delusion, Dawkins (taking his cue from feminists) talks of raising public consciousness. One key area of consciousness-raising was in epistemology. Discrediting faith and relativism was a foundational success. Once these misleading and inhibiting epistemologies were out of the way, it became feasible to correct numerous religious excesses and injustices, which I probably don’t need to list here.

Christopher Hitchens, in particular seemed to bring a spirit of openness and willingness to engage with those he disagreed with. He was often engaged in debate with some religious apologist or other. In addition, he encouraged a generation of young people to pursue the life of the mind, including of course, books. Despite my deep disagreements with some of his ideas, these are of fundamental importance to me.

Sam Harris reported that after writing his book The End of Faith, he received thousands of emails from people – many of them fundamentalists - who had lost their faith. This is encouraging. Fundamentalist religion makes false claims about Gods, but worse, it has a stultifying picture of the good life. Liberation from the mental confines of religion was good for many people, and by extension, society.

On some progressive issues, new atheists were the most uncompromising and honest. They were also robust defenders of free expression and free inquiry. The contributions of new atheism were not only good, but unique. This is why it deserves some label – because it carves at the joints of public discourse since around 2004. And I think it’s perfectly reasonable to speak of an “atheist communities”, regardless of atheism’s lack of innate properties. Atheism doesn’t need to have properties for atheists to have shared interests.   

Limitations

Some of the limits of the new atheism are those of any popular movement. Generally they are led by the most charismatic and easy to digest thinkers, rather than the most meticulous and cautious. This had been true of new atheism. The rigor and meticulousness they displayed in their professional fields was not always carried over to their pronouncements on religion.

The new atheism had a wide variety of spokespeople, but the more meticulous thinkers were less interested in claiming any sort of leadership, and though they were well respected they didn’t have as many followers or books sales as the biggest names. This led to a scarcity of sophistication, and a surplus of sound-bites. This may be a necessity. The more charismatic people tend to be the ones who can rouse audiences with rhetoric and get them to attempt difficult causes and contribute to changing public consciousness.  

For example, when the Pope Joseph Ratzinger visited England, it was probably the presence of Richard Dawkins that bumped up the number of protesters to the tens of thousands. It was hardly as if someone was going to arrest the Pope – but the fact that so many were motivated to get behind someone who seriously suggested it says a lot. Critics of the new atheism always pointed out that religion was never going to go away entirely. But obviously, there are different gradations of progress, and it helped the new atheism that it was uncompromising and willing to aim high. 

Some of the more speculative ideas of the new atheists were unsound, but this is of little consequence. For example, Dawkins’ treatment of the arguments from natural theology is not as incisive or convincing as David Hume’s, but any intelligent person is capable of thinking these things through for themselves. The same goes for Sam Harris’ attempts to argue for moral realism. The failings of these books were not in themselves catastrophic.  

Problems arise when these charismatic but less than meticulous thinkers acquire large followings, who can’t accept their mistakes. This leads to a widespread disrespect for truth – and in some cases for certain branches of knowledge. So although Lawrence Krauss’s treatment of the kalam cosmological argument is in some sense inconsequential, it probably contributed a great deal to the unfair dismissal of philosophy as unimportant. While academic philosophy may have its limitations, there is some sense in which it is of fundamental importance, since science is not only empirical, but interpretive.  So here we have a problem. The movement that is supposed to be based on respect for truth begins to undermine it.  

In the beginning of the movement, Dawkins had a very open-minded attitude to debates with his critics, which in so many words was, “let’s have the argument, and I’ll win it”. This seems, from what I can see, to have morphed into a distaste for the entire project of debating religious apologists. I believe strongly in always talking to people and trying to resolve disagreements using arguments, even if our psychology and entrenched investment in our own beliefs makes this a largely unrewarding task. This leads me to my next point.

If you have a message, is it fruitful to simply repeat it to people who already accept it? And is it fruitful to angrily denounce people who have a fundamental difference with at the expense of real engagement? Probably not. It doesn’t inform people who share your beliefs, and it doesn’t persuade those who don’t.

 The internet, and the intellectual climate now, is filled with groups of people who have devised special reasons to ignore the very people and ideas that they’re supposedly interested in correcting. Certain glorified ad hominem attacks have gained intellectual currency. “Feminazi” is used to dismiss feminist arguments. Feminists won’t listen to “mansplaining”. Certain knock-off Christian apologists won’t listen to someone who hasn’t proven the validity of reason or logic to their satisfaction. Others won’t listen to critiques of biblical passages because they believe that their atheist interlocutors lack a “moral foundation”. Even Peter Boghossian, an atheist philosopher with whom I broadly agree, dismisses the field of philosophy of religion as time wasted entertaining bad ideas and relegates both philosophers of religion and religious apologists to the children’s table. This is particularly unnerving to me – since atheists should have some idea of why the so-called “proofs” fail – yet Boghossian wants to yield pursuit of those questions to Christians.

All of these people have contrived reasons to refuse to listen. They all mistaken their fallible opinions are constitutive of rationality itself.  And they are all wrong. And in acting this way, they relegate their own beliefs to mere dogmas. The new atheist movement isn’t the only one guilty of this, but as a self-styled promoter of critical thinking, it should have been the exception. And now instead of ten thousand person protests against the Pope, we have people recycling the same obvious memes about Pascal’s wager and biblical morality on social media. New atheism became insulated and stagnant – another whiny voice in the marketplace of outrage only interested in the injustices perpetrated against “its own”. And this brings me to Atheism Plus, which attempted – and failed - to correct this.  

Atheism +

It was really inevitable that the new atheism would experience some manner of division. Having gained a strong foothold in the public consciousness and having made some progress with secularist and humanist concerns, some of their interests changed. This is as it should have been. Slavoj Zizek has a nice line - “what you don’t get is part of what you do get”. If secular humanism is to be more than another special interest group in the marketplace of outrage, it should be ready to address a wider variety of problems and injustices. Eventually, focusing exclusively on the evils committed by religious people comes off as unserious and inauthentic. The things you don’t say matter. Eventually, if we have our way, the number of atheists will be extremely high, and educational and social concerns such as creationism, religious homophobia, opposition to contraception and tax-payer funding of abstinence based sex education will be well addressed. Perhaps then it would be time to also address other problems. When the movement was coming together it made perfect sense to set aside differences in order to achieve common goals. But this could only be a temporary state of affairs.

Eventually, some of the new atheists had perhaps similar thoughts, and created Atheism Plus with the aim of addressing a wider range of injustices than those stemming directly from religion. Given that many Western corrective institutions and thinking processes are either explicitly religious or have strong religious undertones, providing secular alternatives is a worthy project. Atheism itself says nothing, except that God does not exist - but that need not stop atheists, people, who are moral agents, from addressing injustices wherever they see it. It didn’t stop the atheist philosopher Bertrand Russell, for example, from speaking out on a wide variety of important issues. Not every individual can match his prolific output – but a large movement of intelligent and well-read people can.

Atheism Plus had laudable goals – but it was executed with abysmal incompetence. It had a broadened interest in correcting injustice, but inherited and intensified the dogmatism of the previous new atheism. It held itself above criticism, which made it alienating and reduced its effectiveness. It had insufficiently interesting personalities – which sadly matters, and that isn’t likely to change. Moreover many of these personalities were resentful that they were something like the B team of the new atheism. When it addressed the mistakes of some of the original “four horsemen” regarding issues such as the Iraq war and arguments for torture and racial profiling, it was done poorly. What should have been a meticulous and painstaking analysis was just a hasty mess of invective and imprecision. As someone who views the Iraq war as a horrible mistake, I view this as a missed opportunity for much needed self-correction. Bertrand Russell would have taken the arguments Hitchens made for the Iraq war, improved them for the sake of charity and then refuted them.

Popular movements depend in part on moral outrage. If they are to succeed, they have to move people to action. This is in part why activists tend to dislike speculative arguments and debate. But outrage without critical thinking is a mistake. It’s not a waste of time to debate the truth or interpretation of data, because we have to be sure what is the case to be sure what decisions we should make. Deriving norms from facts is problematic enough - but trying to derive them from untested truths, lies, or dogmas is even worse.

Given that most issues are more complex than say, the viability of homeopathy and that large numbers of people don’t tend to agree on very much very easily, a wisely put together movement should balance its outrage with a heavy dose of critical thinking and self-doubt. Diversity of beliefs and concerns were both inevitable and good, but the resulting reduction of political effectiveness spawned by dogmatic factionalism was neither. 

I view the atheist movements as on the whole, a good thing. The new atheists helped a lot of people reassess their values and their intellectual commitments. But it didn’t take its own values seriously enough. So many atheists who should have remained critical friends, or friendly critics, dismissed one another as intellectually and morally beyond the pale. Instead of agreeing to disagree, discuss and move forward with shared goals, they drank the dogmatist cool-aid and refused to consider ideas they rejected or to associate with those they disagreed with. What should have been self-correction simply turned into mutual exclusion.  

It’s a shame that new atheism disintegrated into antagonistic factions. But the atheists who made videos and blog posts haven’t all died. It’s still possible for them to be responsible intellectuals and use their talents to address collectively a wide variety of injustices, religious or not. And it can be done without factionalism, and without the insistence that one group is either right or wrong about everything, and without pointlessly hysterical denunciations.

It’s hard to give a criterion for knowing when to engage a person or an idea. But I would rather risk wasting my time refuting some immoral or unlikely idea than being a raging partisan whose life’s project consists of repeatedly asserting about six distinct ideas. 

Perhaps one of the reasons for the stagnation of atheism is that debunking religion and correcting religious injustices were considered ends in themselves rather than as a means. Demolishing Christianity and Islam no longer holds widespread imagination because it’s so easy. Instead of spending so much time arguing that their particular brand of injustice is the most pressing, public intellectuals could together address a wider variety of injustices, in a way which would hold the attention of the public, the way new atheism once did. 

Antinatalism: Still ambiguous

Benatar writes in his book on page 49

If all lives were as free of suffering as that of the imagined person who suffers only a pin-prick, the harms of coming into existence would easily be outweighed by the benefits to others (including the potential parents) of that person coming into existence. In the real world, however, there are no lives even nearly this charmed.

If you saw my last video, you’ll know I find it very strange to be talking about what’s feasible in the real world when you’re arguing for something that you accept is tantamount to impossible.

But what’s stranger is when you compare this quote with the following from page 29.

As will become apparent, my argument does not apply to those hypothetical cases in which a life contains only good and no bad. About such an existence I say that it is neither a harm nor a benefit and we should be indifferent between such an existence and never existing. 

Firstly, this is implausible. Why should we think that a life filled with pleasure and no pain is as valuable as no life whatsoever? Secondly, he appears to have contradicted himself, in saying that suffering can in principle be outweighed [in a chapter called Why Coming Into Existence Is Always A Harm]. Thirdly, Benatar seems to be operating under some kind of utilitarian calculus most of the time, but then hints at a more nuanced understanding of life when he talks about the benefits of parenting. Finally, he seems to be unsure if antinatalism is true by definition or true synthetically. And neither do many run of-the-mill antinatalists, who seem to be too busy listening to Evanescence and liking posts from “antinatalist humour” to read much philosophy.  

My last video got some very interesting comments. Captain Andy commented that the wholesale removal of sentient life on earth is impossible. I believe Dewinthemorning (who unlike me is scientifically literate) also made a video on this. 

I would add that since this is the case, a thoroughgoing antinatalist policy might increase the suffering in the world. If humans forsook the pursuit of a scientific utopia in the futile pursuit of a totally lifeless planet, the net result would be increased suffering. Even if one accepts the doubtful proposal that the best we can do is break even on the scale of pleasure and pain, antinatalism is still an inferior solution than the pursuit of utopia.   

Superficial and Predictable Christian Apologetics: A Response to Steadfast Reflections

I found a blog by the name of Steadfast Reflections (henceforth Mr Steadfast) which attempts to address the problem of evil. It is particularly egregious. I respond to some of it. 

https://steadfastreflections.wordpress.com/2015/01/31/an-alternative-fry-up/

My stuff is in bold. Mr Steadfast's is in italics. 

“You may well have seen it. Lots of people are sharing it around the web. Some are hailing it as a tour de force of irrefutable statements against the worship of God.

Yes, I’m talking about that video of Stephen Fry giving voice to his objection to God: people suffer. Specifically, children suffer. Therefore, he concludes, God is a monster, an evil and stupid being of such mean-minded and selfish caprice that he deserves no respect.

It’s a rather vehement and crude way of restating a problem that people have been talking about for centuries, with much thought, many tears, and considerable energy.”

This is an interesting move. “Much thought, many tears, and considerable energy”. It’s a way of sucking God’s critics into a theological black hole. Anyone who thinks the problem of evil is decisive simply hasn't wrestled with the problem enough.

“So, I've decided to offer my own few thoughts on a couple of problems with Stephen Fry’s invective against the divine, and serve a fry-up of my own; like him, I don’t offer any new insights, nor do I claim to put forward a comprehensive and thorough answer. But for Christians who are unsettled, or others who think he’s got a point, I want to prompt some further reflection about just how persuasive this video is, once you get past the rhetoric.”

And I hope to persuade any viewers that the problem of evil does have a very serious point. So the blog appears to have two main arguments. The first is the old “you can’t criticize my framework from yours” fallacy, and the second is sceptical theism. So let’s listen.

“From whence the complaint?

First, given what Stephen Fry believes about life, the universe, and everything, why does he even have a problem? If all that is, is the result of blind chance, an impersonal materialistic universe that just ‘happened’, then what’s the problem of suffering children? What is suffering? Why care? The weak die, the strong survive, the species carries on – the categories of ‘wrong’, or ‘injustice’, or ‘evil’ have no place.”

Recall the earlier complaint about how Stephen Fry was too hasty in his philosophy about the problem of evil? Now, we’re getting into the branch of philosophy known as meta-ethics. And Mr Steadfast has butchered it. It is not even at the level of bad philosophy.

1)      First of all, even if Mr Steadfast was correct about the implications of atheistic or naturalistic belief, it would still be fallacious to try to block the problem of evil in this way. The critic can show contradictions between Christian beliefs without buying into them himself. So even if the categories of wrong, injustice and evil have no basis on atheism, this is not a defence of Christianity. It is a silly ad hominem.

2)      Steadfast fails to realize that when he talks about the nature of “good” and “evil” he is talking about the branch of philosophy known as meta-ethics. This is something people do professionally. There is a literature on it. When he tries to decide for atheists or naturalists that they have no grounds for caring, because of certain facts about the world, he has committed the most fundamental mistake a meta-ethicist can make – getting an ought from an is without explaining how he got there.

3)      You don’t get to decide what your interlocutor’s meta-ethical view is, or ought to be.  

“Indeed, to speak in such terms is to assume that there is something which goes beyond us, and our universe, something to which we can appeal in order to be outraged at the way things are. From where does the ‘ought’ come? Why ought it to be the case that children don’t undergo pain, and hardship? In an impersonal universe of chance, where evolution is absolute, and we are nothing more than vibrating atoms, there is no claim to be made that some atoms should vibrate in a pleasing way. To suggest that the category of ‘evil’ can remain as a useful human construct misses the fact that whoever says something in the world is wrong, unjust, or evil, they appeal outside the human sphere of authority, to something (Someone?) transcendent.”

This move oozes desperation. The fact that Mr Steadfast needs to be so sceptical about the metaphysics of good and evil just shows how strong the problem of evil is.

In any case, there are various theories of meta-ethics. But it is not even relevant. If someone corrects your mathematical reasoning, do you tell them their worldview can’t explain numbers? Probably not – it would be silly and hypocritical. Stop pretending your worldview has a monopoly on morality or moral explanations. It doesn't.

“What I am saying is that without God, there is no way of accounting for why we even care.”

Using God as a placeholder for meta-ethical explanation is a pathetic attempt at philosophy. You haven’t explained how God grounds morality. You have simply asserted something about transcendence. Who is the rhetorician, really?

“Any model which excludes the Christian God of love and perfection necessarily excludes the complaint that there is even such a thing as suffering, or injustice. In short – if these things trouble you, you (subconsciously, unwittingly) assume the necessary existence of God in order to make the case that God doesn't exist.”

More bad philosophy. There are various ways to take this down. First of all, why not the Muslim God of love and perfection? Secondly, suffering is subjective. Even if there were no truths about justice, sentient organisms would still feel pain.

There is no need to even buy into the concept of objective good and evil in order to run the problem of evil. One can run the problem of suffering instead, which is substantively the same, without loaded language which can be made to look like metaphysical commitments.

So we can criticize the Christian framework without buying into it. Let’s get onto the sceptical defense.

“The Christian God is, quite simply, not like us. He is not a bigger version of me. He is other. He is perfect, in ways that we cannot even begin to understand. He is his own goodness, justice, wisdom, and power.

With an arrogance that so sadly characterizes the brilliant and intelligent people of history, Fry assumes that God can have no reasons for the way things are that he, Stephen Fry, has not countenanced. He gives no consideration to the fact that a being wise and powerful enough to create the universe might just have access to factors, ideas, considerations, to moral qualities of love and goodness, that mere human beings cannot begin to comprehend. That He might have ends, and goals, which are beyond our understanding and judgment.”

So this is the sceptical defence of theism. It is in substance, an appeal to mystery. However, our moral theories cut through such mysteries. Because our notions of suffering, rights, and flourishing have universal scope, it doesn't matter that God is infinite. When someone harms a child, the problem is not that they are not infinitely powerful. The problem is the suffering of the child.

Who is really the moral nihilist? The atheist, or the person who believes that the entire world’s suffering is part of some greater good? And who really believes that humans are “merely puppets” as Christian apologists are wont to accuse?

“In the video, Fry claims that his atheism not only promotes unbelief in general, but also seeks to question what kind of God God might be, given the state of things.”

And also, if God is infinite, and therefore incomprehensible, on what grounds do you say he is good?

“Fry has also removed any semblance of the Christian God, and therefore removed the possibility of a real interaction with this question. It’s an effective presentational skill – neglect any real examination of another position, construct your own ‘opponent’ in its place, and then knock it down. Unfortunately, there is very little substance to it.”

I know, right? For example – “First, given what Stephen Fry believes about life, the universe, and everything, why does he even have a problem? If all that is, is the result of blind chance, an impersonal materialistic universe that just ‘happened’, then what’s the problem of suffering children? What is suffering? Why care? The weak die, the strong survive, the species carries on – the categories of ‘wrong’, or ‘injustice’, or ‘evil’ have no place.”

Moving on…

“We are not entitled to know God’s reasons for what he does, and allows. We may weep, and ache, with the question ‘why?’ We cannot, however, demand God’s justification according to our own standards, and consider him guilty until proven innocent. As a friend remarked concerning this video, it is a great presumption to demand such answers from the one who gives us our very lives.”

This is so sickly and pathetic – and could be used to defend an abusive parent. How can you be so ready to throw away your autonomy and humanity?

In summary, Mr. Steadfast is simply another C.S. Lewis drone, regurgitating bad philosophy, red herrings and quoting the bible, all in a rather butthurt fashion. My advice is to read up on the foundations of morality, and understand why you can’t co-opt it into a deflection of the problem of evil. 

Bless atheists, because it pisses them off

Bless atheists, because it pisses them off

This is a response to an article by Emma Teitel, which discusses Peter Boghossian’s new book, A Manual for Creating Atheists. The article is highly irksome, and the writer seems unfamiliar with the issues around the new atheism and religion. Teitel also does some interesting things with language, i.e. abuses it.

She begins: The door-to-door religious proselytizer is, like his secular cousin the Cutco knife peddler, a harmless irritant of modern North American life.

My response: Religion is not harmless. And by extension, neither are religious proselytizers. To begin an article about a book which contends that faith based claims are harmful, with a mere assertion to the contrary, is to fail to address the issue substantively. It would be trivial to point out how religion is harmful. The Christian right’s regressive stance on many social issues, such as abortion, science education and homosexuality, is something that needs to be addressed by anyone claiming religion is harmless. “Religion is harmless” is a strong claim which many apologists would not even make.

Teitel continues: If you don’t care for his wares, you say no thanks, shut the door and sometimes roll your eyes. But you rarely, if ever, engage.

Portland University philosophy professor and proud atheist Peter Boghossian not only advocates engaging religious fundamentalists in debate, he has written the manual on how to do so.

My response: It is actually a very good book. But I have no idea why Teitel thinks people should refrain from engaging religious people. Instead of rolling your eyes at someone like a sulky teenager, perhaps it is better to talk to them. Actually, Teitel’s disinterest in rational discourse seems to be something of a theme here.

Teitel: His new book, A Manual for Creating Atheists, could be called the bible of deconversion. 

The “de” in “deconversion” is italicized. I think this is supposed to be a witticism. It seems as if every person criticizing atheist writers feels the need to do this. If you are such a person, trust me, it’s not nearly as clever as you think it is.

Statements like “atheism is a religion”, “science requires faith” and “atheist fundamentalist”, do not show an inescapable symmetry between believers and atheists. What they show is an inability to think in fundamentally different terms on the part of the person playing these word games. 

Teitel: Boghossian has a mission: to rid the world of religion through what he calls “street epistemology”—the act of literally talking someone out of his or her faith. Street epistemologists are essentially evangelists of reason, set on shepherding religious people away from the darkness of supernatural dogma and into the light of logic. Sound familiar? Boghossian has taken one of organized religion’s most invasive and possibly problematic practices—proselytization—and turned it on its head.

My response: First of all, how is this statement…

“Boghossian has taken one of organized religion’s most invasive and possibly problematic practices—proselytization—and turned it on its head.”

Reconcilable with this?

“The door-to-door religious proselytizer is, like his secular cousin the Cutco knife peddler, a harmless irritant of modern North American life.”

But passing over the trivial issue of logical consistency, atheism and atheists is not above critique. But there are better ways around it than “you’re just like the religious”.

The language employed in the above passage is contorted at best. Boghossian’s book recommends the exact opposite of shepherding. It advocates the Socratic Method. If you call this shepherding if you want. One could certainly argue that the Socratic Method has its limitations. But granting this, it would be a very different kind of shepherding, and so far removed that it’s not correct to say that Boghossian has turned religious proselytization on its head. It is Teitel who has turned a religious narrative on its head in her analysis. For every word which is supposed to denote a similarity between atheists and fundamentalists, one can point to a relevant difference and show the supposed resemblance to be without substance. The problem with Teitel’s article is that it skips over the relevant details entirely.

While it is true that there are theists and atheists each trying to persuade the other that their position is wrong, there are dissimilarities in the merits of these positions and in the methods of persuasion each side employs. For instance, a fundamentalist may use the threat of eternal torment, while an atheist is most likely to make an appeal to theoretical parsimony. Opposing the former with the latter is not simply the same thing in the other direction. Obviously, this is not always the case. The point is that there are possible cases where there is an obvious dissimilarity. Teitel acts as if no such cases exist.                                                                                                                                  

Proselytization, if it means to simply persuade someone to abandon their view and accept yours, is not a problem. The marketplace of ideas is filled with people who want you to accept their views. What matters are the merits of the ideas in question, and the methods of spreading them.

Teitel continues, quoting Boghossian: “Five per cent of the U.S. population does not believe in God,” he writes. “We have a standing ‘army’ of more than half a million potential street epistemologists ready to let loose to separate people from their faith . . . to deliver millions of micro-inoculations (of reason) to the populace on a daily basis.” A Manual for Creating Atheists is, in a way, an atheist’s attempt at Old Testament-style eye-for-an-eye revenge.

My response: “In a way”. In what way is trying to help people correct their beliefs an attempt to exact revenge? Teitel is distorting language to get her point across. Although I suspect she doesn’t entirely believe what she says. Saying it’s revenge “in a way” is a nice way to affirm the distortion, without affirming it. She is qualifying it away as she says it. When the statement is presented, and then almost negated, it is still there. And yet it is hard to hold someone accountable when they indicate that they don’t mean it in a literal sense. But the problem is that the statement remains there, and it continues to have a functional role in the article.

This is also present in scripture. A certain barbaric injunction is delivered, which over time is negated by apologists and theologians. But the statement is never discarded altogether, and neither are its toxic effects.

Teitel continues: At worst, Boghossian’s approach might appear tongue-in-cheek and harmless, or, if you’re an atheist, noble and necessary. But it points to an unnerving new trend in the world of the non-believing—one that doesn’t merely personally reject religion with a “No thanks, I’ll pass” attitude, but globally opposes it, with the addendum, “And not for you, either, if I have anything to say about it.”

My response: Teitel, you might be able to alleviate your conceptual paralysis if instead of thinking of proselytization as exclusively a tool of religion, you thought of persuasion as a tool for spreading ideas in general. This is a tidier and also fairer way to look at it. Why should religion monopolize the advantage of spreading itself?  

Teitel: Boghossian’s militant atheism not only attacks religion’s zealous and radical manifestations, but targets its benign and secular ones, too.

My response: The distinction is questionable. At best benign and radical religion are points on a spectrum. Religious figures or institutions that are moderate about one issue can very well be regressive about another.

Teitel: When asked what harm a privately religious person could possibly do in the name of his or her saviour, he denies that such a person exists, and insists on characterizing all faiths in the same simplistic fashion—as “pretending to know something you don’t.”

My response: It is possible to have faith without making empirical claims. However, believers who do this are in the vast minority. And by this I mean there are about a dozen such people. The fact is, if religion existed only as a form of personal consolation and did not pontificate about the grand questions and indoctrinate children, it would quickly have no adherents. Most people are not in the business of observing epistemic humility, and this is a problem.

Teitel: Darker still is his tendency to refer to faith as a “virus” and an “affliction.”

Response: It is an affliction wherever it leads to empirical claims. Which is almost always does, except in the case of like one Anglican bishop who treats it as metaphor.

Teitel: Every enlightenment has a dark side. Modern atheism’s may be its creeping idolatry of reason and reality, which, in our current political circumstance, gives way to Islamophobia and sexism—things Boghossian doesn’t endorse, but that some of his contemporaries most certainly do. 

Response: Idolatry of reason and reality gives way to Islamophobia and sexism?  

First of all, why is idolatry? Why does everything have to be framed in religious terms?

And why is fear of Islam irrational?

Teitel: Richard Dawkins has lately been tweeting truisms like, “All the world’s Muslims have fewer Nobel prizes than Trinity College, Cambridge. They did great things in the Middle Ages, though.” In April, he asked via Twitter whether the New Statesman, a U.K. magazine, ought to publish work by a Muslim journalist who believes “Muhammad flew to heaven on a winged horse.”

Response: I don’t think Teitel knows what a truism is. However, one of the perks of my atheism is that I don’t feel committed to the infallibility of any person. I’m quite happy to accept that Dawkins, like everyone else, occasionally puts his foot in his mouth, and I think it is misguided to suggest that Medhi Hassan or anyone else should not be allowed to publish at any magazine, given that he is qualified to do so.

There is an interesting point about the rationality of belief here though. If only one person believed Mohammad ascended to heaven on a winged horse, we would probably call that person mad. I would want to know why beliefs of the batshit crazy variety get a free pass when accepted in large numbers. However, I don’t think that was the point Dawkins was making, and I’m not interested in defending him.

Teitel: “I used to think of atheists as being more upstanding than your average theist, but it’s simply not true,” says Rebecca Watson, a feminist author of the popular blog Skepchick. Like thousands of women active in the online atheist community, Watson has experienced misogyny verging on the deranged. She is regularly called a c–t and receives death threats that cite man’s “superior evolutionary psychology.” (When you can no longer use scripture to subjugate women, why not try science?)

Response: I find it interesting that someone would use Watson as a stick to beat atheists with.

Watson was wrong to think of atheists as more upstanding in general. They are just more right, and not even in general – just about the question of theism.

But what do we do when we come across misogyny or perverted interpretations of evolutionary psychology? We resist these things. When they were more deeply entrenched in our cultures – when women could not vote for example - we resisted them with argumentation and activism.  People did not simply roll their eyes and shut the door. Nothing Teitel has said about the scores of immoral atheists is relevant to the central ideas of Boghossian’s book – that faith is a bad epistemology, and that it is good to cultivate a respect for truth.

Teitel relays the elevator incident, and then says: Boghossian would refute the notion that Dawkins has taken on a deity-like role in the atheist movement, just as he refutes the notion that his own in-your-faith atheism is wrong-headed and potentially dangerous. When I challenged him about Dawkin’s Islamaphobic tweets, he was quick to defend his hero. “There’s a difference between challenging an idea and attacking a person,” he said. “Religion isn’t an immutable characteristic of a person.” He’s right. Technically it’s not. Unfortunately, though, the Nazis didn’t care about technicalities, nor did any other non-religious power that killed on the basis of religion.

Response: I don’t see how this is a point at all. Page brought up a crucial distinction and then responded to it with “yes, but Nazis!” Perhaps Boghossian’s point about immutable characteristics may in some way be missing the point. But if it is, this isn’t how to show it.

I have tried not to give the standard list of atheist grievances against religion, because there are enough videos on that. However, Emma Teitel just doesn’t seem to have very much knowledge about this issue. I don’t know who she is, or what she normally writes about, but this article of hers is dreadfully ignorant. And she uses words extremely loosely, to score cheap points about atheism being some sort of mirror image of religion. There have been hundreds of articles like this written since 2006 calling Dawkins strident and going on about how secularism is “intolerant”, while confusing the secularization thesis with secularism. If you want to persuade atheists to be less strident, you will have to do better than rehashing bad clichés, twisting words, and doing zero research. This article is simply more trash that will not make anyone who knows what they’re talking about rethink anything.

Article in question: http://www2.macleans.ca/2013/11/15/bless-atheists-for-they-have-sinned/

Theistic Argument Against Apologetics

Theistic Argument Against Apologetics

Religious apologetics is often divided into ‘defensive’ and ‘offensive’. ‘Defensive’ apologetics attempts to answer objections to the faith and demonstrate it to be internally consistent, whereas ‘offensive’ apologetics offers positive reasons for the non-believer to accept it.

The field of apologetics may be broadly divided into two sorts: offensive (or positive) apologetics and defensive (or negative) apologetics. Offensive apologetics seeks to present a positive case for Christian truth claims. Defensive apologetics seeks to nullify objections to those claims. - Craig

Believers often maintain that the reason god won’t physically reveal himself is to safeguard human freewill and moral autonomy. For some mysterious reason, God’s physical presence is more doxastically coercive than threats of hellfire. If God were to reveal himself, we would all be so overwhelmed by his power that we would instantly be cowed into submission, but this is not the case with the threat of being eternally on fire.

But, if this is the case, why are religious apologists attempting to logically prove the existence of god with scientific and philosophical arguments? Are apologists trying to violate our freewill?

“But” the apologist says “Why would an abstract proof, as opposed to a physical one, violate our freewill? Surely empirical proof is more compelling and coercive than abstract proof?” This may appear possible. However, if the proof is conclusive, it would force us to accept it on pain of irrationality. Once we are given the proof, we have to be theists. The freewill answer to the problem of divine hiddenness rules out a knockdown proof of God’s existence.

The apologist could point to the fact that according to the Bible (or something), Satan freely rejected God, although he knew he existed. But this works against the apologist. Satan rejected God even with physical proof – showing that physical proof does not violate freewill any more than an abstract one does. (Perhaps a theist would say Satan did not have physical proof, but there are other examples that could be cited, such as Adam and Eve).

There are many theists who argue that theism is the only rational worldview. But if the theist uses the freewill defence to the problem of divine hiddenness, offensive apologetics loses its bite. The offensive arguments like the Kalam cosmological argument or the fine-tuning argument have to be reformulated as defensive – as valid but not cogent enough to change the mind of a reasonable non-believer. For example, Plantinga says that one can choose to accept or reject the first premise of the ontological argument, which makes belief in god reasonable, though not rationally required. If my argument is correct, this will be the most that theists can aspire to in principle.

While these arguments can in principle help bolster theism’s plausibility, they cannot prove theism to someone with a coherent worldview of their own.

Here is the argument in a deductive form.

1.)    If God exists, he remains hidden. 

a)      One could assert that we all know God exists deep down, but this seems like too hard a line to take. And if we all know, why the apparent hiddenness?

2.)    God hides because he does not want us to be forced to accept his existence on pain of irrationality, in order to preserve human freewill and moral autonomy.

a)      There may be other ways of explaining God’s hiddenness, but if God’s intention is to remain hidden, the cogency of apologetic arguments may be doubted.

3.)    Given that God is omniscient and omnipotent; there can be no argument which forces a nonbeliever to accept God’s existence on pain of irrationality.

a)      Presumably, when God created the world, he knew the kinds of arguments that would be available to humans, such as the Kalam, ontological argument, etc. If he wanted to remain hidden, which he apparently does, he would create the universe in such a way that one could rationally reject the premises of theistic arguments.

4.)    Therefore it follows that there can be no conclusive proof for the existence of God.

a)      This does not make theism incoherent, or false. But it means that the so called proofs cannot have sufficient cogency to change the mind of a reasonable non-believer. Apologetics can at best, make theism one of multiple rational choices.

Arguments like the Kalam Cosmological argument try to show that God’s existence is logically obvious. ‘Out of nothing, nothing comes’ is superficially at least, simple and obvious. All the apologist has to do is repeatedly ask ‘what caused this?’ Eventually, barring an infinite series, there must be an ultimate first cause. William Lane Craig complains that answers offered by atheists to this argument are awful.

But if this proof is so simple and obvious, why is god hiding in the first place? If god did cause the universe to begin to exist, with the intention of creating intelligent life, then he created it in the knowledge that those creatures would discover through philosophy and science that time has a beginning, and figure out that only god could have created the universe, as the Kalam proposes. Why then, does god not just reveal himself and save us all the trouble?

If the answer is freewill, then this undermines any apologetic that seeks to argue people into belief. Since god is omniscient, if he wanted to remain hidden, he would not create a world in which a philosophical or scientific proof of his existence would be available. And if he was really keen on human freedom, he would not allow a proof to arise which would have to be accepted on pain of irrationality.

It also seems implausible that god’s primary purpose for humanity is to spend their lives retroactively extrapolating ancient texts and arguing philosophically for his existence. Surely there a better alternative to a cosmic game of hide and seek?

It seems the best move of the apologist is to hedge their bets, and call their philosophical arguments ‘inferences to the best explanation.’ This is all well and good, but the point remains, atheists are free to reject any proof of god’s existence, as long as theists explain god’s hiddenness with an appeal to human freewill. And thus offensive apologetics is in essence, defensive.

Either, the theist has outwitted god, who apparently wishes to remain hidden, or the proofs are in some way fallacious. 



More Objections 

1)      Theistic arguments were never intended to be accepted on pain of irrationality. This argument is based on a straw man.

This is not the sense one gets listening to the likes of William Lane Craig.

I think that this principle, that whatever begins to exist has a cause, is so obvious, that it is virtually undeniable for any sincere seeker after truth. For something to begin to exist without any cause of any sort would be to come into being from nothing. And that is surely impossible…Nobody here this morning here is worried that while you’re listening to this lecture, a horse may have popped into being uncaused, back in your living room right now, and is there defiling the carpet as we speak…We now have good evidence that the universe is not eternal in the past, but had an absolute beginning, and therefore the atheist is backed into the corner, of having to affirm that for no reason whatsoever, the universe just popped into being uncaused, out of absolutely nothing, which is absurd…This is simply the faith of an atheist, in fact I think it takes a greater leap of faith to believe this, than to believe in the existence of God, for it is I repeat, literally worse than magic. If this is the alternative to belief in god, then unbeliever can never denounce believers, as irrational, for what could be more irrational than this? Jews, Christians, Muslims and all who believe in the biblical doctrine of creation, have solid grounds indeed philosophically and scientifically for believing that God creating the universe a finite time ago, out of nothing.

Craig seems to believe that the Kalam argument is not only successful, but cogent enough that it should change the mind of a rational nonbeliever. And as explained, it seems that this is a stronger stance than Craig’s worldview allows.

1.1)  Well Craig is overstating his case here. But the cosmological, teleological, ontological and/or axiological arguments do have merit.

Answer: This argument does not seek to show that theistic arguments are entirely without merit. It only seeks to show that they cannot be cogent enough to change the mind of a rational non-believer.

1.2)  Theism isn’t logically proven, but it is the best explanation of the existence and fine-tuning of the universe.

Answer: An inference to the best explanation is still too much. If theism really is the best explanation of the universe, this would require all rational agents engaging in philosophy and science to lean towards theism. Anyone who is able to follow the chain of reasoning that is science and philosophy should find theism at least likely. This is a deflated way of saying theism is rationally required.

God would have known the epistemology humans would arrive at, and if he was really serious about preserving human freewill, he would not allow even a deflated proof in the form of an inference to the best explanation, because, this would take away the freewill of any nonbeliever engaging in good philosophy and science.

He would not allow this because god is the author of the human mind. He knows what the human mind can do. Since god fine-tuned the capabilities of humanity, he would be able to foresee whether they would be able to find him, or correctly reason that he exists.

1.3)  It’s ambiguous. You can choose your beliefs.

Answer: This is probably false, but it is acceptable for the purposes of my argument. If people can choose their beliefs, then they can choose to reject God even with physical evidence.

2)      There are ways to explain god’s hiddenness without referring to human freewill.

Answer: The only other workable option appears to be the unknown reason defence. But if you don’t know why god hides, why try to reveal him?

3)      There isn’t direct and unambiguous proof because god only wants to be revealed to those who are looking for him. Seek and ye shall find.

Answer: Well then you immediately lose the right to call your proof scientific. Science works by refutation – not by confirmations.

4)      The argument’s conclusion is trivial.

This is probably correct. But there are many theists who hold that atheism is not rationally tenable, due to issues of a first cause, or the obviousness of objective morality. Perhaps it is an interesting puzzle for these fanatics.

Conclusion

This is not an argument against God’s existence. Rather it seeks to show that God’s hiddenness is in tension with the possibility of a successful argument for God’s existence, which should change the mind of a rational, disinterested agent. In short, there is no evidence for God’s existence, and we should not be rationally compelled to believe God provided us with abstract arguments when he could have given us physical evidence. Divine hiddenness makes atheism rationally tenable.

Neither does this argument show how particular theistic arguments, like the ontological or cosmological arguments, are faulty. It does not say if there can be an infinite series, or if existence is a predicate, or anything of that sort. Although my argument could be elaborated, as I briefly did with the kalam, to bring out the various absurdities of a god who hides from us, but hopes we will find him through ontological and teleological proofs. 

Perhaps many theists consider the target – believers who assert that theistic arguments are significantly rationally compelling – to be a straw-man. But perhaps this argument has something to say to the fanatics who insist that the Kalam is undeniable proof of Jesus.

For any theists made it this far, perhaps you think that this argument is trivial, or unsound, because it reasons from untestable premises, or because it is overly ambitious, you may want to consider that this is how religious apologetics looks to non-believers.

Note: This can be found in video form, which distracting music and visuals, here. 

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2asnFMHCeGo

"How do you know your morality is valid then?" - Response to TheCartesianTheist

In attempting to defend the bible, some theists prefer to attack the meta-ethical foundation of their atheist interlocutor, rather than defend the passage in contention directly. Probably these Christians think this is a quick and easy way to answer any challenges to their position.

Usually, what happens is that the theist attacks the meta-ethics of the atheist directly. The line of reasoning is - if the atheist does not have objective morality, no criticism against the bible can stand. (Let’s call this the direct meta-ethical evasion.)

Why is this argument dishonest? A better question to ask is 'when would it not be dishonest?' When would it be acceptable to defend apparently immoral writings with a sudden adoption of moral skepticism? It is highly convenient, to say the least. 

In any case, the direct meta-ethical evasion is unworkable, since regardless of what moral ontology the atheist accepts, it is a matter of scripture contradicting god's omnibenevolence. Meta-ethics is irrelevant.

During his debate with EssenceofThought, TheCartesianTheist asked the question 'are we in agreement that rape is objectively wrong?' At no point did he try to undercut EoT's claims to objective morality – and not simply because EoT didn’t make any. CT's method seems to have evolved slightly. He does not (to my knowledge) use the moral argument for god’s existence, and he seems to have discontinued using meta-ethics as a direct defence of the bible. While he used to do this, (he has a video called ‘The atheistic moral problem’) he seems to have realized that it is unnecessary to argue the atheist into a subjective moral ontology, because they are often willing to admit this themselves. CT's approach is to milk this fact for emotional effect. (Let’s call this the indirect meta-ethical evasion; since it does not rule out criticism of scripture, it is simply a way to cast doubt on the critic.) I find this tactic to be manipulative and dishonest, and also not exactly a paradigm of good philosophy. *Shock horror, 'you don't think rape is objectively wrong?', as though beliefs about moral ontology necessarily said anything about an individual's normative ethics. I imagine professional philosophers don't find this a good way to argue for moral realism. It is the sort of thing one would expect only from a religious apologist.

So in response to his blog, yes, my video was made with CT in mind. But it was also made with various other theistic meta-ethical evasions in mind too; the direct meta-ethical evasions which CT seems to have jettisoned, and also CT’s own indirect ways of using meta-ethics to poison the well. 

But since CT responded to that video, I might as well spell out in more detail what I think is dishonest about his approach in particular. (And why I'm able to point this out). CT begins his blog post:

“I'm quite happy to stand corrected but from the feedback I have received from atheists on YT so far, since my discussion with EssenceofThought (EOT), I am yet to hear an atheist tell me they disagree with EOT and they wish to also affirm that rape is something which is morally wrong beyond a personal denouncement.”

So CT begins by doing the very thing I was arguing against. He also did this during the debate, in his 'teaser' video, and here and there throughout his blog. He is poisoning the well.

I also think personal denouncements go a long way. Even if they are not objective in every sense, that doesn't make them arbitrary, unfounded, or futile. ‘Personal denouncement’ is simply a way of deflating the moral judgments people make. I have videos on this, so I will set it aside for now.

“CV tries to suggest that theists are being underhanded by asking atheists about their metaethics (ohhh-ahhh - how dare they?). Clearly on this point he failed to even listen to my discussion with EOT since I made it very clear I was only asking EOT out of interest and that it would not be part of my defence of Deuteronomy. I made it quite clear what my own view was and, if you listen carefully you will hear EOT claim this is highly significant to the discussion.”

It is underhanded. As I said in my video, it is an attempt to stack the deck against the atheist. CT's subscribers can instantly switch off, since the atheist doesn't have objective morality. There was at least one comment to this effect, which had been thumbed up quite a bit. It's also a nice fail-safe for CT. If he can't defend the passage, he can make meta-ethical evasions.

Again, when would it be acceptable to raise meta-ethics? When would it be acceptable, in trying to defend a set of apparently immoral writings, to even gesture towards meta-ethics? Simply switch the bible with any other questionable set of writings to see why this sort of thing doesn't and shouldn't fly. It's nothing but a smokescreen.

Were Stalin’s purges really bad, or is that just your worthless opinion? No, I'm not saying you can't have your opinion, if you believe killing millions of people isn't objectively wrong than that's up to you. But while we're on the topic, I actually affirm that killing people is objectively wrong. Unlike you. Notice how the person who should be defending their own writings is using the very content of those writings to assert a moral advantage over the critic.

The moral ontology of both CT and EoT is neither here nor there in this argument. All that matters is that if an instance of immorality can be shown in the text, the text is not inerrant and the theist has a contradiction on their hands. I'm not concerned with showing that such a passage exists. I'm interested in what needs to be shown.

“So if I am stating my view clearly up front from the beginning it is surely a matter of interest what EOT's views are? But even so I made it painfully clear that a counter metaethical attack was not going to happen once we got onto the biblical passages and it did not. CV fails on this criticism therefore.”

In the context of a debate about scripture, it doesn't matter what EoT's views on meta-ethics are. Not only because he hasn't studied it, or made videos about it, but because it has no bearing on the question of scripture. It doesn’t matter what anyone’s views are on this. A counter meta-ethical attack was unnecessary anyway, because EoT did not affirm objective morality. He simply pointed out that his and CT's definitions have not always matched and that it was a red herring. He was correct to do this. But CT insisted on waving around his poorly explained ontology and then crying foul when EoT didn’t affirm it.

“At around 1 minute CV states that "objective oughts are a very difficult notion" which is a very interesting thing to note given that he is lecturing his audience on the oughts of proper discourse. That sounds very much like giving instructions in ethical behaviour to me. Is CV simply stating his preference for discussion etiquette then? Well his language certainly sounds otherwise. He appears to be suggesting the theist is doing something objectively wrong and that they OUGHT not ask the atheist their view even out of interest.”

CT seems to be under the impression that this is some sort of brilliant refutation. It isn't. First of all, the question "how can a meta-ethical subjectivist make moral pronouncements?" has been answered by atheist heavy-hitters like QualiaSoup and TheoreticalBullshit. It's also been answered by Aletheia216 in a video response to CT. This response has been up for ten months. I even repeated Aletheia’s response in the video CT is supposed to be addressing. And I've offered my own answers to this question in many of my videos, and I know CT has watched them. This ‘gotcha’ question has been dealt with. But CT is still trying to show I am contradicting myself by loading my position with his presuppositions which I've repeatedly and explicitly rejected. Perhaps it's clear now why I chose the title I did for my video.

I'm sure CT finds these answers problematic, but no amount of partially understood quotations from philosophers can help him gloss over the fact that he's systematically ignored the answers offered, and then acted as if it was I who was ignoring some glaring contradiction. 

As someone who loudly proclaims his own philosophical learnedness, the repeated and insistent use of this cavil is quite amusing. The argument really runs itself. "You believe morality is subjective. You can't use moral language." Simple and easy to remember. This line of arguing is no different in either style or substance from Sye Ten Bruggencate's repetitious question "and how do you know your reasoning is valid?" And just like Stephen Law recommends turning this question on its head and asking 'how do I know you haven't been hit over the head with a rock?' I recommend an analogous approach to CT's egregiously dishonest and malformed inquiry. 

But CT has just given me everything I need, as someone who thinks meta-ethics is not completely objective, to answer him. 'The oughts of proper discourse'. In an agreed upon and specified context, it is possible to give objective answers. Perhaps CT is wondering why he should accept the oughts of proper discourse in the first place. Well I don't think he should. To do so would make pushing his religion rather difficult. My video was not intended to persuade him, but to start a discussion about how rational people should deal with the apologetic slime he so prolifically excretes. I am appealing to common goals in order to achieve an end. No objective moral ontology is required here. This has all been explained before of course. 

Also, even if I were a closet moral realist, as CT seems to imply, I could still think objective oughts are a very difficult notion. Difficult problems are not insoluble. And I would still take issue with CT's devious methods. So CT just bungled a line of argument that normally runs itself. He should stop running on automatic and listen to the people he is engaging.

 “[A small aside. Whilst I accept that the atheist might cause a problem by pointing to an internal inconsistency in the theist's worldview, please note that this is atheistic presuppositional apologetics of the very kind they so often complain about when done to them. They stand back and insist they have a null hypothesis whilst the other person must defend their worldview. This is using the kind of Hovind basterdized presuppositional method in many ways. Notice the advice given in the blurb to his video:

"Turn any challenge to your moral ontology on its head. Don't try to discuss honestly with propagandists, as your explanations will be ignored."

Does that not sound like the very tactics employed by the likes of Hovindites?]”

I'm glad CT quoted that line, given that I've just shown a case of him very resolutely ignoring explanations. I'll stick with my advice. If someone is trying to distract you with meta-ethical hand-waving or other non sequiturs, don't go to the trouble of trying to explain yourself. 

If someone is genuinely trying to have a discussion with you, then that is a different matter. In that case, have a discussion. 

What's more Hovindy, trying to catch people out with loaded ‘gotcha’ questions and repeating sound bites back at them to throw egg on their face, or not bothering to explain yourself to those who use these methods?

Also, I don't claim a null hypothesis. I do claim that Christianity has vastly more philosophical baggage than atheism, because it does. Atheists do not defend any ancient scribblings, or posit a plethora of unfalsifiable phenomena. Theism does both of these. CT knows what I think about this, because he's given my video on it a glowing review.

“CV then complains that the theist fails to appreciate that a subjective or quasi-subjective moral ontology cannot be "meaningful" [c.1:30] but this is not relevant to the discussion I was having with EOT in the slightest and I never suggested one could not have a meaningful ethic if it is not a morally realist one. So why CV brings this in I don't know.”

It might have something to do with CT's incessant repetition of the question 'so is rape objectively wrong?', as though objectivity was the only workable option, and his repeating answers back at people in a shocked and horrified manner, in an attempt to shame them. Also, didn't CT just say that I was contradicting myself in my use of moral language in his blog?

“He appears to be suggesting the theist is doing something objectively wrong and that they OUGHT not ask the atheist their view even out of interest.”

This is strong evidence that CT does think that an objective moral ontology is the only workable one. Even though I didn't really have CT in mind at this point in my video, it does apply to him.

“At around the 1:40 mark CV complains about appeals to emotion (oh the irony) but this does not happen in the discussion and so my head scratching continues.”

Of course it did. CT's debate with EoT was a good example of this sort of appeal to emotion. 'Oh, so you don't think rape is objectively wrong then? That's quite disturbing.' This is also the sort of thing I've been getting from CT and from other theists generally for quite some time. I thought CT would at least be wise enough not to try to pull this during a debate on scripture. 

But also look at CT's 'teaser' for the debate. He also included the segment on meta-ethics there. I think it's clear why CT uses these tactics, which would be forgivable if they were simply unconsidered remarks. But this is CT's considered strategy - to use rape as a way to try to rhetorically beat his atheist interlocutors into accepting moral realism and/or to make them look bad, because saying 'rape isn't objectively wrong' sounds ugly. Even having 'so you don't think rape is entirely objectively wrong?' repeated at you is probably quite annoying too. And it undoubtedly helps CT keep his flock asleep. I think CT's conscious and deliberated use of a something like rape in order to make this point is rather poor form. 

A quick aside, how about an argument for moral realism? We all share the intuition that rape is objectively wrong. But not all of us accept that our moral intuitions are good evidence of anything more. I suspect most people would like to believe in moral realism. All CT has to do is provide a cogent argument for it, but his choice of tactics suggests that hasn’t yet thought of one. 

“CV then chides anyone who dares question the metaethics of people who do not "make pretentions" to have philosophical knowledge! (3:30 ish) Surely CV cannot be talking about his mate EOT at this stage? Not the same EOT who made a four part series on morality entitled respectively:

1. The Morality Of The Godless: Episode 1 - The Development of Morals, Values and Social Norms.
2. The Morality Of The Godless : Episode 2 - The Biological & Evolutional Explanations behind Society.
3. The Morality Of The Godless : Episode 3 - The Socio/Psychological Explanations behind Society.
4. The Morality Of The Godless : Episode 4 - Explanations For Social Conflicts & Wars.”

I don't see an Episode 5. Meta-ethics. There are aspects to morality other than moral ontology, and it is possible to touch on these without being committed to moral realism. In an analogous way, you can do mathematics while being an anti-realist about the ontological status of numbers. (This is the answer Aletheia gave).

“Ironically the previous 'Therefore God' show had been on the very subject of metaethics as well. Suddenly, when rape is the issue, metaethics is now not allowed to be talked about! When it was an atheist on the show that was different.”

Meta-ethics deserves serious study. It shouldn't be used as a smokescreen to deflect criticism and poison the well against critics. I invited CT on to discuss this, but he went on to talk about the bible. Stay on topic, and don't castigate those who ask you to. This is not an outrageous demand.  

“CV then makes the ridiculous claim that I was repeating "You think rape isn't objectively wrong" for emotional effect. The reason this is ridiculous is that he could not personally know my motive for doing that in the first place. Secondly it would mean not taking me at my word during the discussion where I explicitly said the purpose was to find out if we were both in agreement on the matter. Ignoring what people actually say in a discussion and attempting to project motives on them there is no evidence for is not good form. How ironic that CV continues to take the tone of a moral sermon at this juncture.”

I'd like to know what CT thinks he's doing, if not appealing to emotion. Appeals to emotion are completely in place when discussing oughts. You ought to give to charity. But they are out of place when discussing what is. You ought to accept an objective moral ontology. Probably most of us would like to, but it's not clear what this even means. How can an ‘ought’ be completely objective?

I think CT believes that people tend towards moral realism, and repeating these questions is a good way to bring this out. But it is still an appeal to emotion, as it does not solve the problem; it simply tries to beat the interlocutor into submission with a highly loaded question which is repeated ad nauseum. And regarding CT's series on meta-ethics, this is what's wrong with it. The series has stopped after CT argued from intuition. (Perhaps it will continue, but CT evidently prefers to slap together videos in which he trolls genuine educators like AronRa and Thunderf00t, rather than actually creating any substantial content). What is the point of simply arguing from intuition? Philosophers are supposed to question their intuitions, not use their existence as arguments and leave it at that. Anyone can say what appears to be the case.

“To finish I think it is worth noting that despite all his talk of insisting the job of the theist was to show there is no internal contradiction his video did not once admit I had done that very thing and that the vast majority of the discussion was about this. On such matters he had absolutely nothing to say in his video. EOT completely failed in his burden of demonstrating ANY such contradiction existed in the Christian worldview. A Christian is not contradicting their view on rape as being objectively wrong even when they are conservative in their view of scripture since there is absolutely zero evidence of rape being advocated as something other than a wrong act in the entire Bible. EOT was shown to be using a contentious passage with various possible readings as a proof-texting venture and to be arguing from silence when, in pure desperation, he attempted to use Lot at the end.”

CT seems to have misunderstood me. He’s presenting it as a burden of proof issue. I did not insist that. My contention is that if such a contradiction can be shown, the bible is not inerrant, and any biblical inerrantist has a contradiction on their hands. And this is how the atheist can justifiably set aside meta-ethical questions and get on to discuss the details of the scriptural passage in question. I'm interested in what it is sufficient to show, not in demonstrating that such a passage can actually be found. That's for others. I can't sit through the bible. It's profoundly dull and unimaginative. Someone else will have to show how immoral it is. 

Again, my interest is in how to refute meta-ethical distractions, so he seems to have missed the point. 

And given that he accepts that meta-ethics has no bearing on an atheist's critique of the bible, I find his insistence on using it even more dishonest. Again, I believe it’s because CT knows that the more direct meta-ethical distractions won’t fly that he’s muddying the water in this way. 

Regarding ‘arguments from silence’, I find this to be something of a double standard. When the theist wishes to insert something into the text, 'context'. When EoT rightly points out that there is no prohibition of rape in the bible, 'argument from silence'. I think it matters what god neglected to say, but that's just me.

“I suggest theists keep asking atheists to justify their metaethics. The clear message is they have problems in this area and wish to avoid it by always throwing it back on the theist. The default setting of the You Tube atheist is that he will only want to attack your views.”

This is from the person who insists on getting into meta-ethics when discussing passages in the bible. The whole point of my video is that it is CT who is refusing to stay on topic and discuss honestly. In discussing the bible, he insisted on using meta-ethics, a highly difficult philosophical area, in arguing with a non-philosopher. Of course EoT has difficulty there. Philosophers have difficulty there. Everyone but YouTube Christians (who simply sweep their own problems under the rug) have at least some difficulty here.

“Don't allow the atheist to do that. Ask them to explain what they are proposing. If atheists are finding rape a difficult issue to explain in terms of its wrongness then this is one reason to have doubts about atheist ethics I think.”

I suggest theists keep asking this too. But this discussion should be had for its own sake, not as a distraction or a means of poisoning the well. And I also suggest that the conversation should be reciprocal and not one-way. The theist's moral ontology is not unproblematic either – it’s philosophy, there are always problems. These should not be simply glossed over – as they often are. But if theists do not agree to discuss honestly, then atheists should not go out of their way to try to engage them. And using meta-ethics to distract criticism, or poison the well against critics of scripture is dishonest, and also I hope I have shown, unsuccessful.   

Also, if you want explanations, then listen to them. Also, don’t insist that the atheist must accept the subjective/objective dichotomy. (This is in part why the question is loaded). Part of the problem with CT is that in his attempts to procure sound-bites agreeable to his agenda, he runs on automatic and fails to listen. In his world, it’s either objective or it’s worthless. This is evident throughout his post. 

A question for CT - would he agree that using only meta-ethical scepticism to defend the bible (parenthesizing my accusations of his poisoning the well) is dishonest? Because there are many Christians who do this. Perhaps he would like to correct them. 

EoT debating CT: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_VJnNaZzjvg

My video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H9rZUNN7WAs

CT's response to me: http://thecartesiantheist.blogspot.co.uk/

CT's 'teaser' for the debate: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SUuawhwMT2k